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Abstract 
 
We analyze how to ensure efficiency (in the eco-
nomic sense of the word) in structured P2P systems, 
with a focus on heterogeneity. In general, two factors 
influence efficiency, the degree of cooperation and the 
degree of competition. In competitive situations, the 
degree of cooperation tends to be very low. Structured 
P2P systems in turn, where peers have reason to be-
have in a competitive way as well as to cooperate, 
have turned out to be surprisingly efficient - at least as 
long as peers are homogeneous [20]. The reason is 
that there is a rather rigid arrangement of peers, i.e., 
structure, giving way to what is called indirect partner 
interaction. However, the homogeneity assumption is 
restrictive, as peers face different costs and benefits 
due to bandwidth limitations etc. Economic experi-
ments in general (not with a focus on structured P2P 
systems) suggest that heterogeneity is in the way of 
efficiency, i.e., reduces the sum of payoffs received. By 
means of behavioral experiments, we show that most 
peers in structured P2P systems cooperate, even if they 
earn less. This result is an important step towards es-
tablishing structured P2P systems that are operational. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Structured P2P systems administer large amounts of 
data. Peers in such systems are run and maintained by 
different individuals/organizations, and the infrastruc-
ture costs are distributed among the peers. In this pa-
per, we analyze how to ensure efficiency (in the eco-
nomic sense of the word) in such systems.  
 
1.1 Competition and Cooperation 
 
In general, from an economic perspective, two motives 
influence the behavior of interaction partners: coopera-
tion and competition. In competitive situations, i.e., 
several individuals compete, the degree of cooperation 
tends to be very low. The effect of this antagonism is 
that ensuring efficiency is difficult in many situations. 
For instance, think of unstructured P2P systems for file 
sharing which cannot guarantee efficiency and there-
fore high payoffs. (The payoff is the overall benefit 
minus the overall costs of participating.) Peers have an 
incentive to free ride, and most of them actually do [1].  
There is a broad range of settings giving way to both 
competitive and cooperative behavior: Think of two 
colleagues working in the same department. Under 
normal circumstances, they cooperate, e.g., by sharing 
knowledge. As soon as they both apply for the same 
position within the company, they are likely to stop 
cooperating and show selfish behavior. This is in the 
way of efficiency, i.e., the department will not have a 
high output. In competitive situations, selfish behavior 
of participants, i.e., they only care for their own payoff, 
leads to a breakdown of cooperation. Nevertheless, 
competitive markets exist where selfish behavior of 
individuals maximizes the overall payoff [25]. Again, 
think of the two colleagues, from the perspective of the 
employer: When they compete with another department 
also consisting of two individuals for a bonus, all em-
ployees will work harder and maximize their output. In 
the end, the colleagues who do not get the bonus will 
accept this if the competition has been fair.  
Thus, the combination of cooperation and competition 
is promising as it can increase (economic) efficiency. 
However, a system designer has to be careful: Subtle 
design issues can have a significant effect on the out-
come and can even decrease efficiency. 
 
1.2 Heterogeneity 
 
Behavioral experiments on interactions with two par-
ticipants show that the situation is even worse if the 
participants are heterogeneous, i.e., they gain different 
benefits and face different costs from their actions. 
Humans try to ensure fairness among participants 
[5][10], i.e., ensure that the payoffs of participants are 
equal. This usually leads to a further decrease in effi-
ciency [5]. However, while heterogeneity is a problem 
of two-person interaction, it is not a problem in com-
petitive markets. If persons behave in a competitive 
way, the outcome of a market can be very heterogene-
ous: the better trader gets more since he is a better 
trader. In this sense, competition yields stability.   
 
1.3 Structured P2P Systems 
 
In structured P2P systems, each peer can issue queries 
and should contribute to the ongoing work. A peer 
benefits by obtaining query results, while it encounters 
costs for processing queries. Typically, different peers 
are under control of different individuals/organizations, 
who are selfish and want to maximize their payoff. A 
key aspect of the design of P2P systems is efficiency, 
i.e., how much do peers benefit from the system on 
average. Hence, it is important to ensure high levels of 
cooperation. The more peers contribute to the ongoing 
work, the higher is efficiency. 
In P2P systems, competition alone cannot help to reach 
efficiency. The peers face a dilemma of cooperation 
[8]: They can increase their payoffs by not contribut-
ing. On the other hand, systems with an explicit as-
signment of data and services to participants – like 
structured P2P systems – are promising. Here, indirect 
partner interaction takes place [21]. This is a novel 
economic paradigm for situations where participants 
are organized according to a certain structure. The 
structure helps to ensure competition among the peers: 
On the one hand, to receive query results, each peer 
needs to be at least as cooperative as most other peers 
in the eyes of others. On the other hand, the system 
does not suffer from uncooperative peers: As several 
message routes exist to forward queries, cooperative 
peers can replace uncooperative ones. In other words, a 
peer competes with other peers. The structure results in 
cooperation among participants, even if they do not 
interact repeatedly. Thus, this particular combination of 
cooperation and competition yields high levels of effi-
ciency – if all peers face equal costs and benefits. 
 
1.4 Contributions 
 
In almost any P2P system, peers are heterogeneous. 
They have different costs for storing data, due to dif-
ferent hard disk sizes, for issuing messages, due to dif-
ferent bandwidth limitations, etc. As mentioned before, 
economic theory insinuates that heterogeneity has a 
negative effect on cooperation. This calls for an analy-
sis of the impact of heterogeneity on the efficiency of 
structured P2P systems. We use behavioral experi-
ments, i.e., let human participants assume the role of 
peers in structured P2P systems. Since any peer in 
structured P2P systems is under control of a human 
after all (i.e., a human has implemented its behavior), 
such experiments are instructive with regard to (eco-
nomic) characteristics of such systems. 
While fairness leads to a decrease in efficiency in other 
systems, we show that it does not play much of a role in 
structured P2P systems: Here, competition among 
peers fosters cooperation. High levels of efficiency are 
reached. Individual peers are motivated to contribute if 
cooperativeness leads to higher average payoffs. 
Paper outline: Section 2 reviews related work. We in-
troduce the basic concepts of structured P2P systems in 
Section 3. In Section 4 we derive several hypotheses 
concerning our experiments, which we evaluate in Sec-
tion 6, using the methodology described in Section 5. 
We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Measurement studies of existing P2P systems have 
shown that peers in such networks tend to behave un-
cooperatively [1][19]. They download content offered 
by others without contributing to the system. [17] 
shows that such behavior, called free-riding, can lead to 
the break-down of the system.  
To counter such behavior, reputation mechanisms have 
been proposed [13][16]. Here, the peers observe each 
other and behave reciprocally. Different measures to 
quantify peer behavior are available. Kamvar et al. [13] 
propose to use the Eigentrust reputation measure [14]. 
Kung and Wu [15] use an Eigenvector-based reputation 
system. Both publications analyze the usability of dif-
ferent reputation measures to enforce cooperative be-
havior between different peers by using simulations. 
Neither one analyzes the impact of different strategies 
of the participating peers on their mechanisms. 
Buroghain et al. [4] use game theory to analyze the 
strategic aspects when contributing in unstructured P2P 
systems. They show that a mechanism with differential 
service provision will eventually operate at a Nash 
Equilibrium. They use simulations to confirm that this 
equilibrium is even reached when peers are heteroge-
neous. [7] shows that the peers have no incentive to 
free-ride in homogeneous systems. Only if peers are 
heterogeneous they observe, by models and simula-
tions, that peers tend to be uncooperative. [8] extends 
this work: It compares how well different mechanisms, 
such as contribution observations and feedback, ensure 
cooperation. The authors show that the contribution 
level sustains cooperation in smaller systems, but feed-
back is needed in larger systems to cope with white-
washing. Blanc et al. take a similar approach [2] and 
show that the reputation system used is robust in the 
presence of malicious peers and noise. [20] analyzes 
the behavior of human participants who control the 
behavior of different peers. [21] extends this work by 
introducing the concept of indirect partner interaction 
and showing that the usage of feedback does not im-
prove the contribution level of the participants in struc-
tured P2P systems. Several properties of peers in such 
systems are identified. First, peers behave reciprocally, 
i.e., they differentiate between different contacts and 
forward or answer queries only for peers that have for-
warded or answered queries for them before. Second, 
peers use cut-off strategies. I.e., a peer observes the 
behavior of another peer. Only if it is better than a cer-
tain threshold, it cooperates with the other peer. 
While some of the publications mentioned analyze the 
impact of heterogeneity on system performance, they 
do not consider its impact on the strategies used. In 
particular, they do not investigate whether efficiency is 
sustained in the presence of heterogeneity. 
 
3. Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems 
 
In this section, we give a short overview over structured 
P2P systems and Content-Addressable Networks (CAN) 
in particular. Although our experiments were based on 
CAN, we expect our findings to be applicable to any 
system allowing indirect partner interaction, i.e., interac-
tion via peers who interact repeatedly. 
Structured P2P systems such as CAN [18], Chord [28] or 
Pastry [27] maintain large sets of (key, value)-pairs. Each 
key is mapped to a certain location in the key space. The 
key space is divided into several peer zones. Each peer is 
responsible for one of these zones. Next to the zone, each 
peer administers a list of peers with adjacent zones and 
their zones. After issuing a query (asking for a certain 
key), the key is transformed into the corresponding loca-
tion in the key space, the query point. If the query point 
lies in its zone, the peer returns the query result, i.e., the 
value. Otherwise the query is forwarded to the peer clos-
est to the query point. This recurs until the query finally 
reaches the peer having the query result. This peer then 
sends the query result to the initial sender. 
Example: Figure 1 shows a CAN. The keys are trans-
formed into two-dimensional coordinates using a hash 
function known to all peers. The (key, value)-pair 
(“Mars“, “Chocolate Bar”) for example is mapped to the 
coordinates (0.45, 0.3). Each square in the figure repre-
sents a peer zone. I.e. Peer F stores the value correspond-
ing to (“Mars”). If Peer A is interested in information 
concerning “Mars”, it can forward its query using one of 
its contacts: Peer B, C, D, or E. Therefore, “Mars” is first 
transformed into the coordinates (0.45, 0.3) using the 
public hash function. Then the query is forwarded to the 
peer closest to (0.45, 0.3), Peer B. Peer B does not ad-
minister the key “Mars”, hence it forwards the query to 
one of its contacts until the query arrives at Peer F. 
Peer F finally sends the query result to Peer A.  
 
 
Figure 1: Content-Addressable ,etwork 
 
Structured P2P systems have two important properties: 
First, all peers interact with their contacts only. Second, 
several peers have to cooperate to answer a query. Under 
realistic assumptions it can be shown that if only 5% of 
the peers are uncooperative, 40% of the queries in such a 
system remain unanswered [3]. 
To distinguish between cooperative and uncooperative 
peers, each peer can monitor the behavior of its contacts. 
Based on these observations each peer can autonomously 
decide which contacts it deems cooperative or uncoop-
erative. Further, it can decide whether to process a query 
received from one of its contacts and which one to for-
ward it to, when necessary. Experiments have shown that 
peers forward queries for cooperative peers only [20].  
In our analysis we assume that each peer benefits when 
receiving query results, while it faces costs when for-
warding, issuing or answering a query. In what follows, 
we only consider scenarios where the benefit of obtain-
ing a query result exceeds the costs of processing it. In 
this paper, we analyze the effect of heterogeneity 
among the peers on the strategies observed. We focus 
on the influence of different benefits and costs among 
the peers on peer behavior.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
From an economic perspective, the designers of P2P 
systems face a market-design problem. The system as a 
whole is a market of information. Each peer controls a 
fraction of the information in the system and can issue 
queries for some of the information in the system. An 
objective of market design is Pareto-efficiency [29]. A 
Pareto-efficient allocation is one where no participant 
can increase his payoff without another participant fac-
ing a decreased payoff. As this definition is difficult to 
observe in complex settings, we define a market to be 
efficient if the sum of all payoffs is maximal. This goal 
(0,0) (1,0) 
(0,1) (1,1) 
(Mars, Chocolate Bar) A 
B 
C D 
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is in line with the goal of the designer of a P2P system: 
From his perspective, systems are optimal if the sum of 
the payoffs of all peers is maximal. This is the case if 
all peers fully cooperate, and all messages are handled.  
To analyze how efficiency is reached under heteroge-
neity, we will use behavioral experiments, which have 
one important advantage: Existing analyses of P2P 
systems rely on assumptions. [7] for instance assumes 
that heterogeneity does not influence the strategy, but 
only the payoffs. With behavioral experiments, as-
sumptions regarding the behavior of peers are not nec-
essary – the behavior is simply observed. This lets us 
observe not only the impact of heterogeneity on the 
payoff, but also on the behavior of peers. Analyzing the 
behavior of human participants mimicking peers in 
structured P2P systems provides valuable insights: Re-
searchers, be they biologists or sociologists, agree that 
evolution has lead to patterns of human behavior 
(aka. strategies) which are mature and sophisticated 
[11]. They are a good basis for developing protocols 
for systems where software agents interact. 
 
5. Hypotheses 
 
Whether efficiency is reached depends on several spe-
cific design issues. In this section, we show under 
which conditions efficiency is reached. Next, we derive 
predictions on the efficiency of structured P2P systems 
using economic arguments. Finally, we state why we 
expect several existing mechanisms in structured P2P 
systems, such as observations of other peers and cut-off 
strategies, to be beneficial in this context. 
 
 
5.1 Cooperation in Two-Person Interaction 
 
To better understand P2P structures which consist of 
two-person interactions (e.g., a message is forwarded 
from one peer to another one) and the evolvement of 
cooperation over time, we use the helping game [24] as 
an example: One participant has the role of a donor, 
while the other participant is the recipient. The donor 
can decide to make a donation c. In this case, the re-
cipient receives a benefit b. The cost of donating c is 
lower than the benefit b of the recipient. If the donor 
decides not to donate, both participants do not receive 
any reward. Game theory predicts that nobody will 
make a donation. But behavioral experiments [24] 
show that some participants (approximately 22%) actu-
ally donate. The motivation for such cooperative be-
havior is called fairness. But fairness also implies that 
participants favor same payoffs for all. Literature pre-
dicts [6] that this is counterproductive in case of het-
erogeneity, e.g., if the recipient is known to be ‘rich’ 
already when the game starts: Inequality usually leads 
to a decrease in cooperation and efficiency due to fair-
ness considerations [6]. Given a scenario where the 
recipient is already ’rich’, the donor would not give 
him any money. In other words, participants have an 
“inequality aversion”, i.e., prefer allocations where all 
participants have the same payoff, and choose their 
actions accordingly1. This reasoning predicts a de-
crease in efficiency for structured P2P systems that are 
heterogeneous.  
 
5.2 Competition 
 
This subsection discusses competition, which has been 
proposed as a means to ensure efficiency under hetero-
geneity. We explain where exactly competition occurs 
in structured P2P systems. We then say why competi-
tion alone will not sustain cooperation in such systems. 
In competitive markets everybody can provide a good 
to everybody else and obtain a good at any point in 
time. Payoffs can be significantly different:  Competi-
tion ensures efficiency. 
In structured P2P systems, different peers have differ-
ent goods (different pieces of information). Goods only 
exist more than once in case of replication (which we 
leave aside in our current study). Exchange also occurs 
over time: Usually the point of time at which a peer 
requests information is not identical to the point of time 
when others request information from it. 
In systems without competition cooperation tends to 
decrease with the size of the network: [9] describes an 
experiment where peers form a circle, and messages are 
routed along the circle (comparable to a one-
dimensional CAN). In the experiment, participants only 
show conditional reciprocity, i.e. Participant A cooper-
ates on the same level with B as the predecessor of A in 
the circle C cooperates with A. This lead to a decrease 
of cooperation with increasing network size. In the 
presence of only one free-rider, the system collapses: 
the neighbors of the free-rider stop cooperating, then 
their neighbors etc. The situation changes if competi-
tion is introduced, i.e. if participants can forward their 
queries along different routing paths. Here, participants 
play cut-off strategies [20]. These strategies work inde-
pendent of the size of the network and even in the pres-
ence of free-riders: On the one hand, a peer along a 
routing path is exchangeable and feels competition. On 
the other hand, each peer decides for which peers it 
forwards queries. If a peer is not trustworthy in the eyes 
                                                          
1 Heterogeneity has never been a focal point in the analysis 
of the helping game. 
of others, they do not process its queries any more. 
Hence, each peer should more or less be at least as co-
operative as the average peer. This is because the cut-
off value is likely to depend on the average behavior 
observed. Note that these elements of competition are 
present in structured P2P systems, but not in unstruc-
tured ones. 
In structured P2P systems, cooperation and competition 
lead to reciprocal behavior. The outcome is efficient – 
if all peers have the same costs and benefits [21]. This 
is due to the structure of such systems: Although peers 
forward and answer messages on behalf of different 
peers, they only interact with a small group of peers 
that does not change, their contacts. Because of re-
peated interactions, peers can estimate the degree of 
cooperativeness of their contacts reliably. This leads to 
high levels of cooperation. However, these issues have 
only been investigated for the homogeneous case so 
far. It is currently unclear if these findings hold for the 
heterogeneous case as well.  
Competitive scenarios lead to efficiency in the homo-
geneous as well as the heterogeneous case. This gives 
way to the assumption that structured P2P systems with 
heterogeneous peers are efficient as well.  
 
5.3 Predictions for Our Experiments 
 
Section 5.1 has presented argued that heterogeneity in 
structured P2P systems leads to inefficiency. Sec-
tion 5.2 gives way to another conclusion. The motive 
‘cooperation’ makes peers contribute in structured P2P 
systems. Competition in turn might be the motive for 
accepting heterogeneous outcomes. Put differently, a 
peer can be replaced, but a sequence of cooperative 
peers is necessary to process a request. All this calls for 
a holistic analysis.  
Literature predicts that participants who earn less try to 
reduce the payoffs of participants who profit more. 
Think of a participant who benefits five times as much 
as all other participants. His contacts could enforce 
equality by only forwarding every fifth of his queries. 
In our setup however, we expect competition to be a 
stronger motive: As mentioned before, every partici-
pant is interested in having a good standing in the eyes 
of his contacts. If a participant drops several queries 
from another one, his standing becomes worse. Conse-
quently, the probability that his queries in turn are 
processed properly goes down as well. Hence, we for-
mulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4o Strategy Change: Strategies do not 
change under heterogeneity:  
a) Participants do not change their strategies to-
wards a peer which earns more. 
b) Even if the distinguished peers, i.e., the ones 
whose utilities are different, are known, this 
does not result in different payoffs. 
 
Hypothesis Payoff/Efficiency: Payoff and efficiency is 
the same in the homogenous and the heterogeneous 
case: The payoff of a participant (with fixed benefit) is 
the same in the homogeneous and in the heterogeneous 
case. Introducing heterogeneity among peers does not 
influence the payoff of participants. 
Another reaction to heterogeneity might be that partici-
pants leave the system because they deem it unfair. I.e., 
they might stop issuing any queries. We do not expect 
such behavior. Namely, participation is beneficial when 
each participant looks at itself in isolation. 
 
Hypothesis 4o-Leaves: Participants participate at the 
same level in homogenous and heterogeneous systems. 
I.e., they issue queries at the same rate in the heteroge-
neous system as in the homogeneous one. 
 
6. Experiment Design 
 
We have conducted economic experiments with human 
participants. In an experiment, a participant controls 
the strategy of one peer. Each participant decides 
whether the controlled peer forwards, answers or issues 
a query (for each query individually) and decides 
which contact to forward the query to2.  
We conducted the experiments in rounds. Each peer was 
allowed to issue one query per round. The participant 
decided whether to issue the query in each round. At the 
end of each round the participant was shown the current 
total payoff of his peer during the last round and whether 
the experiment continued. The properties of other par-
ticipants were kept secret. 
The experiment environment hides some internals of the 
structured P2P system from the participants: For in-
stance, it manages the list of contacts. When forwarding 
or issuing a query, it calculates the distance of all con-
tacts towards the query point. It then shows a list of con-
tacts ordered by their distance to the query point. The 
order represents the probability that the peer has the de-
sired query result.  
We conducted the experiments with six participants 
each. Even if the participants realized that there were six 
peers only, this would not have influenced their behavior 
– in qualitative terms: The larger the system, the more 
different payoffs do peers have. In small systems, a con-
                                                          
2 A website containing screenshots, a detailed description of 
the game (the written instructions for the players) and the  
experiment results are downloadable from: 
http://wwwipd.ira.uka.de/~schosser/2007-17/ 
tact with higher payoffs is identifiable, and participants 
can readily ‘punish’ it. This is difficult in larger systems 
where interaction typically is via several peers. Further, 
conducting experiments with six participants is in line 
with the observation of Selten [22] that more than five 
humans show the same behavior as in large groups of 
any size.. 
To prevent communication among the participants, their 
terminals were separated from each other. Participants 
could not see the assignment of peers to other players. 
In the beginning of each experiment, all participants 
were randomly seated in the laboratory. During the first 
20 minutes we introduced the participants to the game: 
We handed out a description of the game in written form 
and played several test rounds. Then we played different 
treatments. A treatment consisted of twenty rounds each 
without discounting. We then rolled a ten-sided dice. If 
the dice showed 1, the game ended, otherwise it contin-
ued. This simulates a discounting rate of 0.1. This ap-
proach is common to diminish end game effect: Partici-
pants do not anticipate the end of the game and behave 
as if it continued. 
In all treatments, peers controlled zones of the same size. 
All peers had the same number of contacts. Hence, they 
could expect the same number of incoming queries. The 
experiment environment randomly generated the queries 
participants could issue. 
In all treatments the participants knew which share of 
their queries forwarded via a certain Peer i the system 
had answered. In other words, the experiment environ-
ment displayed the value αi for all contacts.  
iviaissuedqueriesownofnumber
receivediviasentresultsqueryofnumber
i =α
 
However, while a participant knew which fraction of his 
queries sent via a specific peer had been answered, the 
environment did not reveal whether Peer i or any subse-
quent peer had forwarded/answered the query or not. 
For each treatment, the participants initially had a bal-
ance of 100 points. When receiving a query result, the 
balance increased by 20 points. Issuing a query cost 
2 points, forwarding 1 point and answering a query cost 
5 points. This cost structure should reflect the costs and 
benefits in structured P2P systems: While receiving a 
query result imposes a big benefit, issuing and forward-
ing incurs small costs, at least from the perspective of the 
issuer: Only one message needs to be sent. Answering 
includes sending the query result to the issuer, hence the 
costs are higher. If the costs of forwarding, issuing and 
answering in sum were higher than the benefit of receiv-
ing query results, there obviously would not be any in-
centive to participate in the system. 
We played three treatments. The first treatment was 
equal to the game described above (Standard Treatment). 
I.e., the peers had standard payoffs. In the second treat-
ment one peer was randomly chosen and received five 
times the payoff of the other peers (Treatment Luck). In 
this treatment the participants did not know the identity 
of the distinguished peer. (They knew that there was one 
such peer.) Our last treatment was equal to Treatment 
Luck, except that every participant knew the identity of 
the distinguished peer (Treatment Special). 
After the treatments we conducted a strategy game [23]. 
Strategy games are common in economic experiments: 
The participants are asked to describe their strategy in 
own words. While they tend to learn and refine their 
strategies during the treatments, their behavior in the 
strategy game tends to be sophisticated. The strategies 
may depend on treatment parameters and on the history 
of the treatment. The participants are confronted with 
situations they know from the treatments, but on an ab-
stract level. I.e., participants in the strategy game specify 
their behavior for all situations they might encounter. 
From a game-theoretic point of view, a strategy game 
lets us observe complete strategies. 
After the experiment, we paid all participants depending 
on their success in the treatments. Their payoff corre-
sponded to the points earned in the treatments (€ 2.00 per 
100 points). Each participant earned € 18.10 on average. 
 
7. Evaluation 
 
In this section, we evaluate our hypotheses based on 
the treatments and the strategy games conducted. 
 
7.1 Hypothesis ,o Strategy Change 
 
To analyze whether participants change their strategies 
towards peers that earn much more, we look at the re-
sults of the strategy game. Here we asked the partici-
pants to describe their strategies towards the distin-
guished peer and towards the other ones. 
 
Strategy Category # Players 
Same strategy towards all 
peers 
a) 38 
Queries sent to distin-
guished peer preferably 
b) 10 
Queries never sent to 
distinguished peer 
c) 2 
Table 1: Behavior Changes When Issuing 
 
Tables 1 and 2 list the results. We used three different 
groups of strategies to classify the behavior observed: 
a) Same strategy towards all peers independent 
of their payoffs. 
b) More cooperative strategy towards the distin-
guished peer. 
c) Less cooperative strategy towards the distin-
guished peer. 
In most cases the strategies towards the distinguished 
peer are the same as towards all other peers (Cate-
gory a)). While several participants prefer to issue their 
queries via the distinguished peer (Category b)), only 
few chose to never send any queries through it (Cate-
gory c)). This changes when it comes to forwarding and 
answering. A majority of peers still does not make the 
distinction. Among the other peers, less prefer to coop-
erate with the distinguished peer over other peers com-
pared to issuing (Category b)). Furthermore, more par-
ticipants show uncooperative behavior towards the dis-
tinguished peers (Category c)). I.e., there is a small 
tendency among the participants to punish the peer 
earning more. But this tendency is behind any statisti-
cal significance. On average, the strategies do not 
change. Even in case of answering, where more partici-
pants change their behavior towards the distinguished 
peer compared to issuing and forwarding, a binomial 
test confirms this on significance level of 1%.  
 
# Players Strategy 
 
Cat. 
Answer Forward 
Same strategy towards all 
peers 
a) 34 37 
Queries of distinguished 
peer are handled preferred 
to others 
b) 4 5 
Queries of distinguished 
peer are not handled 
c) 12 8 
Table 2: Behavior Changes When Answering/Forwarding 
 
In addition, we analyze whether the payoff of the dis-
tinguished peer changes between Treatment Luck, 
where this peer is not known, and Treatment Special. 
Table 3 shows the results. The payoff decreases in half 
of the games, and it increases in the other half of the 
games. I.e., we cannot confirm at an acceptable signifi-
cance level that the payoff increases or decreases. 
 
7.2 Hypothesis Payoff/Efficiency 
 
To learn whether introducing heterogeneity influences 
the efficiency of the system, we analyzed the payoffs of 
all participants with standard payoffs in Treat-
ment Standard and Treatment Luck (see Table 3). 
While the payoff of all peers with standard payoffs 
increases in half of the treatments and decreases within 
the other half, we cannot confirm that the payoff in-
creases or decreases at a certain significance level. I.e., 
although the participants in the luck treatment know 
that another peer earns a lot more than they do, they 
keep playing as in the homogeneous treatment.  
 
 
 Standard Peers Distinguished Peer 
 Treatment 
Standard 
Treatment 
Luck 
Treatment 
Luck 
Treatment 
Special 
1 9,16 8,72 53,87 53,33 
2 7,40 10,57 87,33 22,80 
3 7,01 7,65 88,40 66,53 
4 9,21 5,81 42,27 42,67 
5 5,56 5,67 80,73 53,87 
6 9,50 8,71 75,27 81,73 
7 8,63 10,25 46,13 67,60 
8 8,49 10,36 73,87 73,60 
9 6,01 3,49 12,60 61,00 
10 6,61 1,92 23,40 30,47 
Table 3: Payoffs 
 
Treatment Special confirms these results as well. See 
the web page with the experiment results for details. 
 
7.3 Hypothesis ,o Leaves 
 
To analyze whether participants tend to leave the sys-
tem when heterogeneity is introduced we compare the 
number of queries issued per standard peer in the dif-
ferent treatments. See Table 4.  
 
 
Treatment 
Standard 
Treatment 
Luck 
Treatment 
Special 
Group 1 14,17 15,40 17,60 
Group 2 14,50 18,60 19,60 
Group 3 16,33 17,20 18,20 
Group 4 16,50 17,80 18,00 
Group 5 14,00 17,20 19,00 
Group 6 16,50 16,00 18,60 
Group 7 16,83 19,40 19,60 
Group 8 15,83 19,00 19,20 
Group 9 14,67 16,00 15,80 
Group 10 14,83 11,60 15,60 
Table 4: ,umber of Queries Issued 
 
The number of queries issued in the standard treatment 
is higher than in the other treatments for one group 
only. I.e., despite the fact that one peer earns more than 
the others, peers keep participating in the system. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
P2P systems are heterogeneous, i.e., peers have differ-
ent benefits and cost structures. We have studied the 
effect of heterogeneity on efficiency in structured P2P 
systems. Efficiency is an important design objective. It 
gives peers an incentive to participate. 
A key aspect of our study is how structured P2P sys-
tems actually reconcile the two different behavioral 
motives cooperation and competition.  We use behav-
ioral experiments to investigate this. Behavioral ex-
periments are the means of choice – standard economic 
models assuming only selfish actors do not always pre-
dict actual behavior well if cooperation is concerned.  
Our results are as follows: Efficiency in structured P2P 
systems does not decrease, the strategies of the peers 
do not change, no additional leaves occur, and coopera-
tion persists if we compare the homogenous to the het-
erogeneous case. This shows that structured P2P sys-
tems are systems that can actually reconcile the two 
behavioral motives cooperation and competition. This 
result is important: It means that existing protocols 
already help to reach efficiency under heterogeneity. 
 
9. References 
 
[1] Adar, E. & Huberman, B.: Free Riding on Gnutella 
Xerox PARC, 2000.  
[2] Blanc, A. et al.: Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer 
Routing, Proc. of the IEEE Infocom, 2005  
[3] Buchmann, E. & Böhm, K.: FairNet - How to Counter 
Free Riding in Peer-To-Peer Data Structures, Proc. of 
the International Conference on Cooperative Informa-
tion Systems, 2004. 
[4] Buragohain, C. et al.: A Game Theoretic Framework 
for Incentives in P2P systems, Proc. of the Interna-
tional Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2003. 
[5] Fehr, E. & Falk, A.: Wage Rigidity in a Competitive 
Incomplete Contract Market, Journal of Political 
Economy, 107, 106-134, 1999. 
[6] Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M.: A Theory of Fairness, 
Competition, and Cooperation, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 114 (3), 817-868, 1999. 
[7] Feldman, M. et al.: Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-
to-Peer Networks, Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-
Peer Systems, 2003  
[8] Feldman, M. et al.: Robust Incentive Techniques for 
Peer-to-Peer Networks, Proc. of the ACM Conference 
on Electronic Commerce, 102-111, 2004. 
[9] Greiner, B. & Levati, V.: Indirect reciprocity in cycli-
cal networks – An experimental study, Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, 26 (5), 711-731, 2005. 
[10] Grosskopf, B.: Reinforcement and Directional Learn-
ing in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competi-
tion, Experimental Economics, 6 (2), 141-158, 2003. 
[11] Hagen, E. & Hammerstein, P.: Game theory and human 
evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of 
experimental games. Theoretical Population Biology. 
69, 339–348, 2006.  
[12] Isaac, R. & Plott, C.: Price Control and the Behavior 
of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination, 
American Economic Review, 71, 448-459, 1981. 
[13] Kamvar, S. et al.: Incentives for Combatting Freeriding 
on P2P Networks, Proc. of the International Euro-Par 
Conference, 1273-1279, 2003. 
[14] Kamvar, S. et al.: The EigenTrust Alogrithm for Repu-
tation Management in P2P Networks, Proc. of the 
WWW, 2003. 
[15] Kung, H. & Wu, C.: Differentiated Admission for 
Peer-to-Peer Systems: Incentivizing Peers to Contrib-
ute their Resources, Proc. of the Workshop on Eco-
nomics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2003. 
[16] Ngan, T. et al.: Enforcing Fair Sharing of Peer-to-Peer 
Resources, Proc. of the International Peer to Peer 
Symposium, 2003. 
[17] Ramasamy, L. & Liu, L.: Free Riding: A New Chal-
lenge to Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems, Proc. of 
the International Conference on System Sciences, 
2003. 
[18] Ratnasamy, S. et al.: A Scalable Content-Addressable 
Network, Proc. of the Conference on Applications, 
Technologies, Architectures and Protocols for Com-
puter Communications, 161-172, 2001. 
[19] Saroiu, S. et al.: A Measurement Study of Peer-to-Peer 
File Sharing Systems, Proc. of Multimedia Computing 
and 4etworking, 2002. 
[20] Schosser, S. et al.: Incentives Engineering for Struc-
tured P2P systems - a Feasibility Demonstration Using 
Economic Experiments, Proc. of the ACM Conference 
on Electronic Commerce, 280-289, 2006. 
[21] Schosser, S. et al.: Indirect Partner Interaction in P2P 
Networks - Stimulating Cooperation by Means of 
Structure, Proc. of the ACM Conference on Electronic 
Commerce, 2007. 
[22] Selten, R.: A simple model of imperfect competition 
where four are few and six are many, International 
Journal of Game Theory 2, 141-201, 1973. 
[23] Selten, R. Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des 
eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eine 
Oligopolexperiments, Beiträge zur experimentellen 
Wirtschaftsforschung. Heinz Sauermann (ed.), 136-
168, 1967. 
[24] Seinen, I. & Schram, A. Social Status and Group 
Norms: Indirect Reciprocity in a Helping Experiment. 
European Economic Review, 50, 581-602, 2001. 
[25] Smith, V.: Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental 
Science, The American Economic Review, 72 (5), 923-
955, 1982. 
[26] Smith, V. & Williams, A.: The boundaries of competi-
tive price theory: convergence, expectations, and 
transaction costs, Bargaining and Market Behavior: 
Essays in Experimental Economics, 286-319, 2000. 
[27] Rowstron, A. & Druschel, P.: Pastry: Scalable, distrib-
uted object location and routing for large-scale peer-to-
peer systems, Proc. of the IFIP/ACM International 
Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms (Mid-
dleware), 329-350, 2001. 
[28] Stoica, I. et al.: Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup 
protocol for internet applications, IEEE/ACM Transac-
tions on 4etworking, 11, 17-32, 2003. 
[29] Varian, H.: Intermediate Microeconomics, W. W. Nor-
ton and Company, 5. Edition, 1999. 
